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1.0 How Can We Mitigate 
Capture in Financial Regulation?
Stefano Pagliari1
1.1 Introduction
The interaction between policymakers and market participants in the
regulation of financial markets is marked by a paradox. In a dynamic
and technically complex environment such as that of financial
markets, regulatory authorities are required to develop a constant and
close interaction with the market participants they regulate in order to
stay abreast of rapidly changing financial markets, to monitor the
build-up of risks, and to understand the impact of their regulatory
policies. However, the same proximity between regulators and market
participants that is required for regulators to effectively perform their
responsibilities has also been described as opening the regulatory
process to the risk of unduly favouring narrow industry interests at the
expense of the public. This distortion in the regulatory process is
commonly defined as “regulatory capture”.
The problem of regulatory capture in financial regulation has attracted
renewed attention in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
Different academic works, journalistic accounts, as well as official
inquiries have all emphasized the impact which the undue influence of
special interests has played in causing a relaxation of regulatory
1 Stefano Pagliari is a PhD Candidate at the University of Waterloo and a Research
Associate at the International Centre for Financial Regulation. His work focuses on the
political economy of the regulatory response to the global financial crisis. His
published work appears in International Organization, the Journal of European
Integration, and the Journal of European Law and he is the Co-Editor (with Eric
Helleiner and Hubert Zimmerman) of ‘Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of
International Regulatory Change’ (Routledge, 2009).
2 See for instance FCIC (2011). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. Final Report of the
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United
States. Washington, DC, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission; Johnson and Kwak
(2010). 13 Bankers. New York, Pantheon Books.
3 Cited by Masters (2011). ‘King calls for discretionary powers’. Financial Times.
London. 3 November.
4 Carpenter and Moss (forthcoming). Draft chapter of ‘Introduction’. In: Preventing
Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It, by Carpenter and
Moss (forthcoming), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.5.
5 Strachan (this volume).
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constraints in the period preceding the crisis.2 The Governor of the
Bank of England, Mervyn King, has branded regulatory capture as ‘one
of the major problems leading up to the crisis’.3
However, despite references to regulatory capture having permeated
much of the discourse on financial regulation, and in spite of a
significant body of academic studies and commentaries dissecting 
the regulatory process in finance and the relationship between
policymakers and the financial industry, only a minority of these works
has ventured into a systematic discussion of policy solutions to
mitigate capture in financial regulation. As Carpenter and Moss have
argued in an important recent contribution to the subject, ‘all too
often, observers of regulation are quicker to yelp about capture than
to think hard about how it might be prevented or mitigated. Analyses
stop at diagnosis without venturing to the matter of cure.’4 This
tendency also applies to the same regulators and regulated
institutions that have been the targets of criticism. These have been
reluctant to publicly discuss any deficiencies or conflicts which may
emerge from their interaction, or indeed any measures which could
strengthen the integrity of the policymaking process in finance. As a
result, a debate regarding how to structure the interaction between
the financial industry and regulatory agencies has struggled to emerge
in the public policy sphere, and that of capture has remained a subject
that ‘generates more heat than light’.5
This publication aims to make a contribution towards addressing this
gap in the academic literature and public policy debate by identifying
a set of realistic policy measures which seek to mitigate the risk 
that the process through which financial rules are designed and
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implemented may be captured by special interests. In order to achieve
this objective, this publication departs from the existing analysis of
regulatory capture in finance in two important ways. First, it draws on
a variety of perspectives, combining the contribution of academics
with the experience of regulators and former regulators, financial
industry practitioners, as well as other stakeholders such as consumer
groups and non-financial end users. Second, rather than looking at
finance in isolation, this publication includes perspective from
different academics and policymakers whose primary experience and
research extends to sectors outside of the financial realm, such as
regulation of the telecommunication industry, energy markets, and
the automobile industry. Concerns regarding the undue influence of
special interests are not unique to financial policymaking, and a closer
look at the experience of these sectors outside of finance offers
important insights into possible policy responses to the problem of
capture in the financial regulatory arena.
This introductory chapter will summarize the main findings of the
different contributions. The first part of this chapter will discuss four
aspects of the policymaking process that have been identified by
different authors as conducive to diverting the content of regulatory
policies away from public interest and towards favouring special
interests: 1) the asymmetrical participation of the financial industry
and other stakeholders in the formulation of regulatory policies; 2) the
institutional context within which financial regulatory policies are
designed and implemented; 3) the ideas, beliefs and mind-sets guiding
the work of regulators; and 4) the broader political context in which
the financial regulatory process takes place.
The acknowledgement of multiple channels and mechanisms that may
lead regulation to unduly favour narrow interests has led different
commentators in the past to discount the possibility of effectively
countering this phenomenon. Contrary to this perspective, this
publication argues that the risk that regulatory policies will divert from
the public interest to favour special interests can be mitigated through
different strategies to balance the impact of factors driving regulatory
capture. The wide range of mitigating strategies discussed by the
different contributors to this publication and the broader literature
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will be divided into three broad agendas, based on the respective
points of intervention in the regulatory policymaking process.
A first set of proposals focuses on the engagement of different
stakeholders in the regulatory process and seeks to mitigate capture 
by promoting greater balance and diversity among the groups
competing to influence the content of regulatory policies. Some of 
the different solutions discussed to achieve this objective include the
creation of participatory mechanisms that favour the engagement of a
broader range of groups, measures to strengthen the position of
consumer groups and other groups with a diffuse membership in the
policymaking process, and approaches to foster the emergence of
countervailing forces against the risk of capture within the financial
industry.
A second set of proposals focuses on the institutional context within
which regulatory policies are designed and implemented and seeks 
to mitigate the risk of capture by reforming those elements that may
bias the action of regulators in favour of certain stakeholders. These
measures include reforms to the mandates of regulatory agencies,
changes in internal decision making procedures, reforms in staffing
and recruitment practices, as well as changes in the level and sources
of funding.
Finally, a third set of proposals seeks to mitigate the risk of capture by
subjecting the regulatory process to greater external scrutiny. These
recommendations include measures to increase the transparency of the
regulatory process, increasing the legal system’s scrutiny of the regulatory
process, the creation of expert review bodies to monitor the integrity of
the regulatory process, and measures which seek to strengthen reciprocal
oversight against the risk of capture from other regulatory agencies within
the same country and at the international level.
1.2 What is regulatory capture?
The concept of regulatory capture is often traced back to the work of
Nobel Laureate George Stigler four decades before the outbreak of the
6 Stigler (1971). ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation.’ Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science, 2: 3-21.
7 See Peltzman (1976). ‘Towards a More General Theory of Regulation.’ Journal of
Law and Economics, 19: 211-48; Laffont and Tirole (1991). ‘The politics of government
decision making. A theory of regulatory capture.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106:
4. For a review of the literature see Dal Bó (2006). ‘Regulatory Capture: A Review.’
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2): 203-25.
8 Baxter (this volume).
9 Johnson and Kwak (2010), op. cit. in footnote 1.
10 See Ridley (this volume) for the UK experience
11 Mügge (2010). Widen the Market, Narrow the Competition. Colchester, ECPR Press.
12 Walter (2008). Governing Finance: East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards.
Ithaca, Cornell University Press
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crisis. Stigler argued that concentrated producer groups are able to
systematically exercise a disproportionate influence over the conduct
of their regulators to the point of shaping regulation to suit their
interests rather than their mandate to maximize social welfare.6 Since
Stigler’s pioneering work, an important scholarly tradition known as
the “special interest” theory of regulation has analysed the dynamics
which may lead regulatory agencies to unduly favour the industry they
had responsibility for regulating and thus to deviate from the public
interest.7
While the analysis of regulatory capture has developed primarily to
shed light on distortions in the regulation of other industries outside
of finance, this ‘theory of private distortion of public purpose’8 has
become a privileged lens through which to interpret financial
regulatory policymaking. Most attempts to theorize and analyse the
process of capture in financial regulation have emerged from the US
experience.9 However, references to the undue influence of special
interests have also informed different analyses of financial
policymaking in other industrialized countries,10 at the European
level,11 in emerging market countries,12 as well as within international
bodies such as the Basel Committee and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, where the influence of
financial industry groups over the international regulatory initiatives
has led different authors to develop the concept of “transnational
13 Underhill and Zhang (2008). ‘Setting the rules: private power, political
underpinnings, and legitimacy in global monetary and financial governance.’
International Affairs 84(3): 535-54; Lall (2011). ‘From failure to failure: The politics of
international banking regulation.’ Review of International Political Economy; for a
critique see Young (2012). ‘Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical
examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision.’ Review of International Political Economy.
14 Mattli and Woods (2009). ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in
Global Politics.’ In: The Politics of Global Regulation, by Mattli and Woods, eds (2009),
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
15 Baxter (2011). ‘Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the
Common Good?’ Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 21(1): 175-200, p. 187.
16 Sheng (this volume).
17 Walter (2008), op. cit. in footnote 11.
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regulatory capture”.13 Indeed, the fact that the analysis of regulatory
capture has developed primarily from the US experience has often
meant analysts have overlooked how the nature and the extent of
regulatory capture may vary considerably across these contexts.
The concept of regulatory capture has also been associated with
different phases of the financial regulatory policymaking process.
Most attention has been paid to the rulemaking phase. In this area,
undue influence of the regulated sector is most commonly associated
either with the absence of regulatory measures that would impose
costs on the regulated entity or with the introduction of rules that fail
to adequately defend broader societal preferences. However,
regulatory capture could also manifest itself in the development of
more stringent regulations that allow market leaders to eliminate
present and future competition.14 Furthermore, the concept of
capture has also been used as an analytical lens to explain failures in
other phases of the regulatory policymaking process in finance, such
as in the supervision of financial firms,15 or in the enforcement16 and
implementation phases of financial regulation17. In these phases,
pressures from the regulated institutions have been presented as
conducive to a lack of tough enforcement and investigation, or
conducive to episodes of regulatory forbearance where regulation is
not fully enforced. As Walter suggests in this volume, the more
‘opaque, extended, and complex’ nature of the implementation phase
provides a more fertile terrain for the influence of organized interests
18 Walter (this volume).
19 Carpenter and Moss (forthcoming), op. cit. in footnote 3; Carpenter, Moss, Wachtell
Stinnett (this volume).
20 Baxter (2011), p. 176, op. cit. in footnote 14.
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than does the rulemaking process, since a trade-off may exist between
the intensity of the pressures exercised by these interests during the
rulemaking and implementation phases.18
The popularity of regulatory capture as one of the main analytical
lenses through which to explore failures in financial regulatory
policymaking also reflects some of the limitations of this concept,
starting from its ambiguity. Different works have frequently refrained
from seeking to define regulatory capture or provided very different
definitions of this phenomenon. A more analytically precise definition
of regulatory capture comes from Carpenter and Moss, who have
described this concept as ‘the result or process by which regulation (in
law or application) is, at least partially, by intent and action of the
industry regulated, consistently or repeatedly directed away from the
public interest and towards the interests of the regulated industry’.19
However, the application of this definition to the financial policy realm
relies on the capacity to clearly define where the “public interest”
resides in a given regulatory issue and to identify when a policy shift
away from this solution is the result of the action of special interests
with clearly delineated and divergent interests. The uncertainty
surrounding the impact of financial regulatory policies and the
presence of at times competing objectives, such as ensuring stability
and a stable flow of credit to the economy, make the task of identifying
the public interest ex-ante often challenging. The definition of capture
presented by Baxter bypasses the problem of identifying what is in the
public interest, since he argues that regulatory capture is present
‘whenever a particular sector to the regulatory regime has acquired
influence disproportionate to the balance of interests envisaged when
the regulatory system was established’.20
A second limitation of the concept derives from the fact that, as Baxter
argues, regulatory capture is ‘at once a theory of legislative and
regulatory motivation and a vituperative accusation levelled at results
21 Baxter (this volume).
22 Carpenter and Moss (forthcoming) op. cit. in footnote 3. See also Carpenter (2004).
‘Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a politically Responsive, Learning
Regulator.’ American Political Science Review 98(4); Baxter (2011), op. cit. in footnote
14; Young (2012), op. cit. in footnote 12.
23 Johnson and Kwak (2010), op. cit. in footnote 1.
24 Carpenter, Moss, and Wachtell Stinnett (this volume).
25 Strachan (this volume).
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unfavourable to one of the contesting groups’.21 As a result, this
allegation is likely to be raised even if the regulation strikes the right
balance among competing interests. However, claims regarding the
extent of this phenomenon are frequently supported by only weak
empirical evidence. Carpenter and Moss argue that analysts have
often inferred capture from episodes in which regulators partially rely
upon firms, from patterns of regulatory advantage granted to certain
groups, or simply ‘on the basis of observations of undesired regulatory
outcomes, even though those outcomes might be caused by a number
of things besides capture such as ‘regulators’ incompetence,
inefficiency, or randomness’.22
Given the difficulties in defining and assessing capture, it comes as no
surprise that disagreements persist among different commentators
regarding the extent of this phenomenon, including among the
contributors to this volume. For some authors, undue influence
exercised by financial industry groups remains a structural distortion in
the regulatory process in finance, which limits the possibility of
achieving effective policies.23 In their review of the broader literature,
Carpenter and Moss find little support among empirical researchers
for this kind of extensive influence by special interests leading to
regulation detrimental to the broader public. Instead, they argue that
capture seems to manifest itself in degrees, in some cases having no
discernible effects on regulation, and more commonly limiting a
regulator’s efforts to serve the public interest, but not to the point of
compromising the regulatory policy.24 For others, capture remains
more an issue of “perception” than reality, which could still undermine
the confidence in the rulemaking process if left unchecked.25
Furthermore, various authors in this publication argue that undue or
inappropriate influence over the financial regulatory process could
26 Mogg (this volume) argues that in the world of gas and electricity, the risk of undue
influence on the regulatory process comes not only from the producers such as power
generators and suppliers, but also from the same group that regulators are duty-
bound to protect, that is, consumers, in particular large corporate consumers.
27 The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has sometimes been criticized for
being captured by environmental groups rather than the industries it regulates. See
Kwak (forthcoming). ‘Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis.’ In: Preventing
Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It, by Carpenter and
Moss (forthcoming). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
28 See Mogg, Briault, Ridley, Green, and Strachan (this volume).
29 This taxonomy draws upon Baker (2010). ‘Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-
America, crisis politics and trajectories of change in global financial governance.’
International Affairs, 86(3): 647-663
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come from a plurality of stakeholders besides the largest financial
services firms or the financial sector targeted by the regulation in
question. From this perspective, capture by the industry which is
directly targeted by the regulation is only a subset of different
captures, and a multitude of participants within or outside finance are
capable of exercising ‘an influence that knocks the regulator off its
original balance’, which may include large consumers,26 NGOs,27 or
politicians following their own electoral considerations.28
However, the most important source of disagreement among the
different scholars and commentators in this publication concerns the
mechanisms through which regulatory policies come to diverge from
the public interest towards unduly favouring narrow interests. Building
upon the taxonomy introduced by Baker,29 it is possible to identify four
aspects of the financial policymaking process that make financial
regulatory policymaking particularly prone to be captured.
1.2.1 The asymmetrical nature of stakeholders’ participation in the
regulatory process
The first element identified by the literature as influencing capture is
to be found in the asymmetric participation of different stakeholders
in the financial regulatory process. The central premise underlying
theories of regulatory capture is the notion that the actions of
regulators are significantly influenced by the mobilization of different
organized interests and stakeholders deploying an array of financial
30 Igan, Mishra and Tressel (2009). A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial
Crisis. IMF Working Paper, WP/09/287. Washington, DC; Johnson (2009). “The Quiet
Coup.” The Atlantic, May 2009.
31 FCIC (2011), p. xviii, op. cit. in footnote 1.
32 Americans for Financial Reform (2010). Wall Street Influence, By the Numbers.
33 Mogg (this volume).
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and technical resources in the attempt to influence the content of
regulatory policies. However, different commentators have argued
that in financial regulatory policymaking this competition among
stakeholders, to influence the content of financial regulatory policies,
is characterized by a concentration of resources in the hands of a
restricted range of financial firms.
Much attention has been directed towards the financial resources 
that these groups are capable of harnessing in the policymaking
process.30 This is particularly the case in the US context: in the 
period from 1999 to 2008 the financial sector spent US $2.7 billion 
in reported federal lobbying expenses,31 and during the financial 
crisis the same sector incurred daily expenses of US $1.4 million 
to lobby Congress.32 However, the greater imbalance among
stakeholders is not in terms of financial resources, but rather in terms
of technical information, which Mogg describes as the ‘fuel’ that
regulators require to regulate complex policy environments.33
Theorists of regulatory capture have highlighted how “capture” is
more likely when regulation is highly complex, and when information
asymmetries between the regulated industry and the regulators are
greater. The complexity inherent in financial regulatory policies and
the built-in advantage that the financial firms targeted by specific
regulation have in terms of knowledge and information vis-à-vis other
stakeholders are factors that increase the dependence on industry for
expertise.
Moreover, many analysts have lamented the lack of engagement with
financial regulatory debates from stakeholders such as deposit
holders, investors, and consumers of financial services. Besides being
disadvantaged vis-à-vis financial industry groups in terms of financial
resources and technical expertise, these groups’ voices remain
hindered by their diffuse nature and the resulting ‘collective action
34 Olson (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Harvard University Press
35 Stigler (1971), op. cit. in footnote 5; Wilson (1980). The Politics of Regulation.
Wilson. New York, Basic Books; and Mattli and Woods (2009), op. cit. in footnote 13.
See Farnish (this volume) for the experience of consumers groups.
36 Pagliari and Young (this volume). See also Pagliari and Young (2012). ‘Leveraged
Interests: Financial Industry Power and the Role of Private Sector Coalitions’. Available
at www.stefanopagliari.net
37 Mogg (this volume).
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problems’.34 While the financial groups who are the primary target of
regulation will have strong incentives to constantly monitor and seek
to steer the action of regulators, other stakeholders face greater
challenges in coordinating and in mobilizing the organizational and
informational resources required to compete with the financial
industry groups in the marketplace for influencing regulation.35
Indeed, the survey of respondents to financial consultations
conducted by Pagliari and Young finds that less than 10% of the
stakeholders who respond to financial regulatory consultations belong
to trade unions, consumer protection groups, non-governmental
organizations, or research institutions.36
However, the tendency to aggregate figures regarding the
participation of different financial interest groups and the money
spent by these groups to lobby policymakers often masks the fact 
that the interests and demands of different financial groups 
frequently diverge and in some cases counteract each other. In
addition, the presence of “consumers” of financial regulatory services
in financial regulatory debates is more diverse than most regulatory
capture theorists assume. For instance, Mogg suggests that, in the
case of energy, regulation is important to differentiate between the
millions of households who pay the bills but do not engage in
regulatory debates over the energy markets and the large corporate
energy consumers who are instead better positioned to solve
collective action problems, engage with regulators and resist decisions
going against their interests.37 This insight also applies to the case of
financial regulation. Pagliari and Young argue that while NGOs and
consumer organizations are proportionally less active in response to
financial regulatory policies than in other sectors, non-financial
38 Pagliari and Young (this volume); see also Raeburn (this volume) on the experience
of corporate end users in the regulatory response to the crisis.
39 Masciandaro, Quintyn and Taylor (2008). Financial Supervisory Independence and
Accountability – Exploring the Determinants. IMF Working Paper, WP/08/147.
Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund.. For a theory of capture accounting for
the delegation of regulatory power, see Spiller (1990). ‘Politicians, Interest Groups,
and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or “Let Them be
Bribed”.’ Journal of Law & Economics, 33(1): 65-101.
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business groups that represent the large end users of financial 
services are instead active participants and their impact over the
design of regulatory policies has indeed increased in the aftermath 
of the crisis.38 In other words, debates surrounding financial
regulatory policies do not always present the sort of frontal and
asymmetrical clash between competing producers’ and consumers’
interests described by some regulatory capture theorists, but 
rather they often involve a greater plurality of stakeholders and
heterogeneous coalitions comprising both financial and non-financial
stakeholders.
1.2.2 The institutional context
A second factor identified by the literature as influencing the possibility
that regulatory policies will be captured is the institutional context
within which the societal participation discussed above is channelled.
Unlike other areas analysed by theories of regulatory capture, financial
regulatory policies are seldom designed and implemented by
politicians themselves. Instead, this task is delegated in normal times to
independent regulatory agencies that are not part of the executive
branch of government.39 While the delegation of regulatory functions
to independent agencies has been an attempt to protect the 
regulatory process from short-term pressures of politically influential
stakeholders, the institutional design of independent regulatory
agencies may still tilt the playing field in favour of certain stakeholders.
Despite the statutory autonomy of independent regulatory agencies,
financial industry groups continue to maintain preferential access 
40 Hardy (2006). ‘Regulatory Capture in Banking.’ IMF Working Paper, WP/06/34,
January 2006.
41 Baxter (this volume).
42 Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform (2009). In Praise of Unlevel
Playing Fields. The Report of the Second Warwick Commission. Coventry, University of
Warwick; Baker (2010), op. cit. in footnote 28.
43 For the governance of central banks with regulatory responsibilities, see Frisell,
Roszbach and Spagnolo (2008). ‘Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central
Banks.’ Sveriges Rikbank Working Paper, Series 221.
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to regulators and to interact with them in an often opaque and
discretionary environment, with many discussions occurring behind
closed doors. Other institutional features of environments in which
this interaction takes place may lead regulators to unduly favour the
financial industry groups under their surveillance.
One of these is the formal mandate of regulatory agencies. In some
cases, regulatory agencies have often been granted an explicit
mandate to promote the interests of certain groups over others.40
For instance, certain regulatory agencies such as the US Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency are statutorily directed to promote 
the interests of the banks under their oversight.41 Similarly, 
the mandate of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
includes a clause to “have regard to” the competitiveness of the
financial services industry, an element which has been described 
as skewing the incentives of regulators, and increasing the risk they
will prioritize the role of the City of London over other statutory
duties.42
Others incentives to favour financial industry groups may be
embedded in the governance of regulatory agencies. In particular,
different regulatory agencies rely on levies applied to the financial
industry as the primary source of funding. In some cases, financial
industry representatives have a direct representation on the boards of
regulatory agencies and thus potentially influence key decisions and
the selection of executives.43 In particular, the governance of the
Federal Reserve System has come under the spotlight in recent years,
since executives of banks that are regulated by the Fed and that have
44 GAO (2011a). Federal Reserve Bank Governance. Opportunities Exist to Broaden
Director Recruitment Efforts and Increase Transparency. United States Government
Accountability Office. GAO-12-18. The notion that these banks may benefit from the
appointment of their representative on the Federal Reserve Boards is supported by the
tendency of their stock price to rise in the aftermath of this announcement, while recent
research has provided evidence that banks with Fed directorships were more likely to
receive public funding during the financial crisis. See Adams (2011). ‘Who Directs the
Fed?’ ECGI - Finance Working Paper, No. 293/2011; Duchin and Sosyura (2010). ‘TARP
Investments: Financial and Politics.’ Ross School of Business Working Papers.
45 Woodward (2001). ‘Regulatory Capture at the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.’ In Barth, Brumbaugh and Yago, eds (2000). Restructuring Regulation and
Financial Institutions. Milken Institute Press
46 Masters (2012). Enter the revolving regulators. Financial Times. London. 23 April
2012. For the case of Japan, see Walter (this volume).
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received emergency loans during the crisis often serve on its board of
directors.44
Moreover, much attention has been paid to the hiring practices in
regulatory agencies and in particular to the “revolving doors” that
exist between the financial industry and regulatory agencies. This term
points to the fact that regulators often find their best career
opportunities within the firms they regulate, but the reverse trend is
also true, that is, the flow of individuals from the industry to the
regulatory positions.45 Debates regarding the relationship between
revolving doors and regulatory capture have primarily emerged in the
US context, where the flow of people between regulators and the
financial industry has remained a defining feature of the main
regulatory institutions since their creations. European regulatory
bodies have instead been characterized by career silos with
bureaucrats spending most of their career in the state sector under
various restrictions discouraging the transition. However, a shift
towards a more US-style flow of individuals between regulatory
agencies and the financial industry is noticeable in many jurisdictions
such as in the UK, where the FSA in recent years has deliberately
sought to hire lawyers from the private sector in order to strengthen
its enforcement division.46
Theories of regulatory capture have held that revolving doors may
distort regulatory policies in favour of the financial industry. Firms that
47 Lall (2012), op. cit. in footnote 12.
48 DeHaan, Koh, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011). ‘Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s
Enforcement Outcomes?’ Unpublished manuscript. GAO (2011b). ‘Securities and
Exchange Commission. Existing Post-Employment Controls Could be Further
Strengthened’, United States Government Accountability Office. Report to
Congressional Committees. POGO (2011). ‘Revolving Regulators: SEC Faces Ethics
Challenges with Revolving Door’, Project on Government Oversight. Currie (this
volume).
49 Kwak (forthcoming), op. cit. in footnote 26.
50 Buiter (2009). Central Banks and Financial Crises. Maintaining Stability in a
Changing Financial System, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
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hire former regulators have been described as having an unfair
advantage over other groups owing to insider knowledge and
preferential access to the regulatory agency.47 Most importantly, given
that regulatory authorities often find in the firms they regulate and
supervise the most common source of future employment, this could
create incentives to be lenient towards prospective future employers.
The academic literature has presented only mixed evidence of this sort
of inter-temporal conflict of interest, and some authors have argued
that those regulators more likely to be hired by industry are often
those that are tougher in their supervisory activity.48
1.2.3 Intellectual capture
While the traditional concept of regulatory capture in the academic
literature has focused on material incentives between regulators and
different stakeholders, the recent financial crisis has led a number of
authors to broaden this concept and to investigate how the possibility
that regulatory policies will favour a narrow set of special interests
could be influenced by the regulators’ ideas, beliefs and mind-sets.
Terms such as “intellectual capture”, “cognitive capture”, and “cultural
capture” have been used to signal instances where, as Kwak argues,
special interests are able to ‘shape policy outcomes through influences
other than material incentives and rational debate’49.
For instance, Buiter has argued that in the period before the crisis the
Federal Reserve displayed ‘excess sensitivity … not just to asset prices
but also to the concerns and fears of Wall Street more generally’.50 For
51 Dorn (2010). ‘The Governance of Securities. Ponzi Finance, Regulatory
Convergence, Credit Crunch.’ British Journal of Criminology, 50(1): 23-45.
52 Turner (2009). ‘Roundtable: How to tame global finance.’ Prospect, 162,August 27.
See also Briault (this volume).
53 Sheng (this volume); Baker (2010), op. cit. in footnote 28.
54 Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform (2009), op. cit. in footnote
41. FSA (2009). Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis.
London, Financial Services Authority
16 - Pagliari
Dorn, in the period preceding the crisis, ‘regulators found it “natural”
to utilize models and datasets developed by private interests, 
so sidelining questions of systemic risk and public interest’.51
This diagnosis of pre-crisis regulatory failures has been acknowledged
by regulators and former regulators. The Chairman of the FSA, 
Lord Adair Turner, has argued that before the crisis regulatory
authorities were prone to ‘regulatory capture through the intellectual
zeitgeist’, which enabled the influence of banking lobbies to hold
sway.52
However, different views remain regarding which factors determine
this form of capture. Several analyses have acknowledged the
importance of the broader intellectual climate of the period, in
particular the ascendancy within the academic community and many
regulatory authorities of ideas highlighting the efficiency of financial
markets at understanding and allocating risks, their self-stabilizing
nature, and the benefits of financial innovations for the real
economy.53 This change in the dominant paradigm provided the
intellectual basis for several important pieces of legislation in the
period before the crisis, from Basel II to a greater reliance on
disclosure and market discipline, as well as a broader reassessment of
the purpose of regulation and a scaling down in the ambitions of
regulatory action.54
Other authors have identified sources of intellectual capture inside 
the regulatory process, and discussed how the repeated interaction
between regulators and the financial industry could contribute to align
the way in which regulators think about problems with the view of the
industry they regulate. Building upon the insights coming from
55 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012), p. 38, op. cit. in footnote 1.
56 Kwak (forthcoming), op. cit. in footnote 26.
57 Ibid.
58 Baxter (2011), p. 184, op. cit. in footnote 14.
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psychological studies on the importance of group identities, Barth,
Caprio, and Levine have argued that ‘even well-intentioned,
incorruptible officials might be subject to the same human
psychological factors that induce referees and umpires in sport to
conform to the interests of the home crowd’.55 In the case of financial
regulators, the home crowd is represented by the financial services
firms with whom they interact on a daily basis in order to perform
their regulatory and supervisory duties.
Kwak has further broken down the sources of this bias in favour of 
the financial services industry and argued that regulators are 
more likely to trust and to adopt positions advanced by 1) ‘people
whom they perceive as being in their in-group’, 2) ‘people whom 
they perceive to be of higher status in social, economic, intellectual, or
other terms’, and 3) ‘people who are in their social networks’.56
According to Kwak, financial regulators often identify themselves 
as ‘economically sophisticated steward[s] of efficient financial
markets’ and are more likely to side with the financial institutions
which enjoy a higher prestige because of their technical knowledge
and with whom they share more social networks than with 
consumer groups and other stakeholders. According to Kwak, the
potential for this sort of capture increases with the complexity of the
problem: ‘faced with uncertainty deciding between competing
theories of the world and the public interest, people are more likely 
to fall back on the signals communicated by identity, status, or
relationships’.57
From a similar perspective, different scholars have argued that the
major impact of the revolving doors phenomenon and the repeated
interaction between regulators and regulated firms as described
above is not the conflict of interests which may result, but rather the
nurturing of a kind of ‘consanguinity’58 in the policymaking process,
59 Tsingou (2008). Transnational private governance and the Basel process: banking
regulation, private interests and Basel II. Transnational Private Governance and its
Limits. Nolke and Graz. London, Routledge. Seabrooke and Tsingou (2009). ‘Revolving
Doors and Linked Ecologies in the World Economy: Policy Locations and the Practice
of International Financial Reform.’ CSGR Working Paper, 260/09; Warwick Commission
on International Financial Reform (2009), op. cit. in footnote 41.
60 Fullenkamp and Sharma (2012). ‘Good Financial Regulation: Changing the Process
is Crucial.’ ICFR-Financial Times Research Prize. Green (this volume). Sheng (this
volume).
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supporting a process of intellectual convergence between like-minded
individuals across the public and private sector, socialization, and,
ultimately, “intellectual capture”.59
1.2.4 Capture through the political process
Finally, while the different faces of capture described above pertain to
the interaction between regulators and the regulated firms, different
commentators have broadened this analysis to account for the role of
the politicians, governments and legislative bodies who define the
responsibilities that independent regulatory agencies need to follow
and grant them the resources and powers to perform these tasks. The
relationship between regulators and their political masters creates
additional venues for regulatory capture, as different stakeholders will
often seek to change regulators’ course of action of regulators
indirectly through the political process.60
The literature has identified different factors which influence the
potential that elected politicians will heed the demands of certain
special interests and interfere in regulators’ actions. First, in countries
such as the United States, the financial industry remains one of the
major contributors to politicians’ electoral campaigns across the
political spectrum; consequently it is able to exercise a significant
influence over the voting behaviour of Congress on certain regulatory
issues. Second, given the significant externalities that certain financial
regulatory issues may have on the rest of the economy, politicians may
interfere in the actions of regulators in order to achieve key political
objectives such as economic growth, employment, social and
economic stability. Different authors have therefore highlighted the
61 Sheng (this volume). See also Green (this volume).
62 Cross (this volume).
63 Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform (2009), op. cit. in footnote 41.
64 See also Viñals and Fiechter (2010). ‘The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to
Say “No” ’. IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/08.
65 Walter (this volume).
66 According to different commentators, crisis-time regulatory politics may still introduce
distortions in the regulation and supervision of financial markets by frequently leading to
the possibility of an excessive tightening of regulation in the moment when it is least
desirable (“regulatory overkill”). For a discussion of the distortions in the content of
regulations that characterize the policymaking in a crisis, see Green, Ridley (this volume).
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risk that politicians may pressure regulators in order to achieve short-
term political objectives by pleasing powerful electoral constituencies
or special interest groups, regardless of changes in the legislation.61
This sort of interference is particularly likely in the context of booms.
The critical role that the supply of credit plays in ensuring the growth
of the economy creates strong incentives for politicians to avoid
regulatory policies that may interfere with ‘the (apparently) successful
prevailing machinery of growth’62 and jeopardize their chances of re-
election. At the same time, the low political salience that financial
regulatory issues have during financial booms makes it more likely that
arguments regarding the risks generated by inadequate regulatory
policies will not resonate with elected politicians.63 As a result of this
political climate, during boom times regulatory agencies are likely to
face pressures to be accommodating in the implementation of
financial rules, thus hindering their capacity to “remove the
punchbowl from the party” – particularly in areas such as prudential
supervision and macro-prudential regulation which are more
susceptible to economic and electoral considerations.64
At the same time, the pressures upon regulators coming from the
political sphere may be reversed in the aftermath of crises or scandals.
These events are likely to increase the political salience of financial
regulatory policies among the broader electorate and can create
incentives among elected politicians to be tough on the industry in
order to extract electoral rewards.65 According to different
commentators, the financial reforms introduced after the crisis have
not been immune from this sort of dynamic.66 However, a crisis causing
67 Green (this volume).
68 Walter (this volume).
69 Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform (2009), op. cit. in footnote
41; Baker (2010), op. cit. in footnote 28; Johnson and Kwak (2010), op. cit. in footnote
1; Helleiner and Pagliari (2011). ‘The End of an Era in International Financial
Regulation? Towards a Post-Crisis Research Agenda”. International Organization 65(3).
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a severe deterioration of economic conditions is likely to increase
rather than weaken the influence of the financial sector over the timing
and nature of the rules implemented. Periods of slow economic growth
may reinforce concerns that regulation may be preventing small
businesses from accessing credit and damaging the recovery of the
economy.67 In particular, in those circumstances where an apparent
trade-off exists between the mandate of regulatory agencies to bolster
financial stability and the goal of promoting economic growth (such as
in defining appropriate capital requirements for banking institutions),
then political incumbents as well as a number of societal stakeholders
are more likely to support financial industry groups in demanding a
watering down of the regulatory measures introduced in the middle of
the crisis.68
In sum, as a result of the influence that the broader electoral and
economic cycles have over the regulatory process, the possibility that
financial regulation will be captured by special interests must be
regarded as cyclical rather than static phenomenon, alternating
between periods of crisis and boom.69
1.3 Towards a policy agenda against regulatory capture
This diagnosis of the different determinants of capture in financial
regulation reveals how this represents a more multifaceted and
complex phenomenon than is portrayed in many journalistic and
scholarly accounts. The potential that a piece of regulation will unduly
favour certain special interests is influenced by a multitude of factors,
such as the kind of mobilization this will raise among different
stakeholders, the institutional context, the dominant ideas, as well 
as the broader political and economic context surrounding the
policymaking context.
70 Baxter (2011), p.188, op. cit. in footnote 14.
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These different channels and mechanisms make the potential for
regulatory capture a partly inevitable aspect of the financial regulatory
process, given the information-intensive nature of financial regulatory
policies and the proximity with market participants required for
regulators to stay abreast of market developments. At the same time,
while it is implausible that this risk may be eliminated from the
regulatory process, the attempts of financial industry groups and
other stakeholders to influence the content of regulation towards
their interests and the other mechanisms of capture described above
can be channelled through mechanisms designed to mitigate their
impact.70
The remainder of this chapter will present a wide range of different
safeguards and mitigation strategies that could reduce the potential
that regulation will diverge from the public interest and unduly 
favour specific interests. These strategies will build upon the 
academic literature that has examined the making of good regulation,
but also from the direct experience of different contributors 
to this volume in regulatory policymaking, both in finance and 
other sectors. For the sake of clarity, these measures will be 
divided across three broad policy approaches to mitigate the risk 
of capture: 1) measures promoting greater balance and diversity in 
the competition among different stakeholders; 2) reforms of the
institutional context within which regulators operate; 3) opening 
up the regulatory process to different external checks and 
balances.
1.3.1 Rebalancing the participation of stakeholders in the regulatory
process
Different proposals to mitigate capture have focused on redressing
one of its main determinants, that is, the imbalance between the
capacity of financial groups to have their voice heard in the
policymaking process and those of other stakeholders, such as
depositors, investors, and consumers, whom the proposed rules are
71 Johnson and Kwak 2010, op. cit. in footnote 1.
72 See Carpenter, Moss, Wachtell Stinnett (this volume).
73 Kroszner and Strahan (2000). ‘Obstacles to optimal policy: the interplay of politics
and economics in shaping bank supervision and regulation reforms.’ Center for
Research in Security Prices, Working Paper 512, February 2000), p. 38.
74 See Carpenter, Moss, Wachtell Stinnett (this volume); Farnish (this volume)
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designed to protect. While for authors such as Johnson and Kwak this
goal requires the breaking up of institutions too big to fail, to constrain
their political influence,71 others have focused on balancing the
influence of these financial industry groups by strengthening the
plurality of voices in the regulatory process.
The experience of other sectors reveals how the involvement of 
a plurality of stakeholders besides the producers targeted by 
the regulation in the regulatory process, such as other business
groups, non-governmental organizations and consumer movement
organizations, can play a crucial role in keeping the influence of the
regulated industry in check and limiting the potential for capture for
different reasons. First, in a complex policy environment such as
finance, strengthening the plurality of voices and perspectives in the
regulatory process is important to reduce the risks that regulators find
themselves exposed to one-sided evidence from the regulated
financial sector.72 Second, as Kroszner and Strahan argue, ‘competition
among rival interest groups can increase the likelihood of beneficial
reform. Rival groups have an incentive to battle each other in addition
to battling the consumer. If they dissipate their efforts against each
other, they are less likely to be able to support narrow special interest
regulation.’73 Third, measures seeking to strengthen the plurality of
groups in the regulatory process may also be an important counter to
the risk of groupthink and intellectual capture, to the extent that these
groups are capable of bringing different ideas and perspectives into
the regulatory process.74
Three broad views remain among the authors regarding what
measures could be introduced to achieve this goal: first, the creation
of participatory mechanisms; second, tripartism and proxy advocates;
and third, strengthening the diversity of views within the financial
industry
75 Mattli and Woods (2009), op. cit. in footnote 13.
76 Mogg (this volume). For a discussion of the limits of existing consultations, see
Ridley (this volume).
77 Ayres and Braithwaite (1991). ‘Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment.’
Law & Social Inquiry, 16(3): 435-96. Ridley (this volume); Currie (this volume).
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1.3.1.1 Creating participatory mechanisms
Mattli and Woods have argued that regulatory policies are less likely to
deviate from the public interest when they are developed through
‘participatory mechanisms that are fair, transparent, accessible and
open’, thus favouring the participation of those stakeholders that are
less well connected to the regulators.75 The main mechanism through
which this principle has been translated into the financial regulatory
process is by subjecting regulatory policies to public consultations.
This approach is increasingly being accepted by most regulatory
agencies, although this varies significantly across bodies.
However, as different contributors have argued, public consultations
by themselves are unlikely to be sufficient to ensure that a plurality of
stakeholders will be capable of having their share of the input into the
regulatory process. On this note, various adjustments have been
suggested to avoid the risk that consultations may be being conducted
solely to discharge formal obligations, such as granting different
stakeholders sufficient time to digest the implications of the rules
proposed, publicly summarizing the position of the different
stakeholders, and justifying how these positions have been treated
with respect to the final decision.76
Moreover, in order to compensate for the informational advantage of
industry insiders participating in these consultations, different authors
have also suggested that regulators should grant full access to the
information available to them, including, for example, their internal
data and analyses.77 Along the same lines, a regulatory agency may be
given the power to generate and disseminate information to remedy
the public’s information disadvantage vis-à-vis the industry. According
to Barkow, regulators must be given the power to ‘make the public
aware of pending issues so that industry is not the only one who
knows about them’, as well as ‘the authority to study and publicize
78 Barkow (2010). ‘Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design.’ Texas Law Review, 89(1): 15-79, p.59.
79 Currie (this volume).
80 Ayres and Braithwaite (1991), op. cit. in footnote 76.
81 Raeburn (this volume).
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data that will be of interest to the public and help energize the public
to overcome collective action problems and rally behind the agency’.78
These and other measures used to generate and disseminate
information and enhance transparency in the consultation process are
described not only as prerequisites to allow an informed debate
among different stakeholders, but also as tools allowing ‘the smaller,
less well-funded interests (notably consumer interests and SMEs) to
engage in the issues, possibly against the deep pockets of the
incumbents’79.
1.3.1.2 Tripartism and proxy advocates
The introduction of participatory mechanisms is in itself however
unlikely to be effective in levelling the playing field and achieving an
adequate participation from a plurality of stakeholders. In a highly
technical area such as financial regulation, the financial industry
groups with the greatest technical expertise continue to be best
positioned to take advantage of these mechanisms, while those
stakeholders with diffuse membership are constrained in their
capacity to take advantage of the channels of access to the
policymaking process.
Other authors have therefore discussed the creation of alternative
mechanisms to empower the mobilization of groups with a diffuse
membership such as consumers, investors and other entities, such as
granting these groups a privileged position within the regulatory
process, termed “tripartism” by Ayres and Braithwaite.80 Within the
context of financial regulatory policymaking, Raeburn has called for a
‘form of affirmative action’ on the part of regulators to strengthen the
voice of those real economy interests whose representation is more
fragmented.81 Farnish has stressed the need to create the conditions
for a more proactive engagement of regulators with consumer groups,
82 Farnish (this volume).
83 Schwarcz (forthcoming). Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment
Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation. In: Preventing Regulatory
Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It, by Carpenter and Moss
(forthcoming). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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for instance by investing in processes to gather real-time intelligence
from groups, designing consultations in ways that make better use 
of consumer representatives’ limited resources, and creating direct
routes for designated consumer groups to present complaints to
which regulators need to respond within a defined timeframe.82
However, the capacity of consumer groups and NGOs to effectively
engage in the policymaking process continues to be constrained by the
fact that most of these bodies active in financial regulatory
policymaking are too small, disperse, and underfunded. For other
commentators, however, the objective of redressing the imbalance of
power between consumers’ and firms’ resources and strengthening
the voice of the former in the policymaking process requires a more
direct intervention by policymakers. One mechanism would be for
policymakers to subsidize the creation of consumer groups. This is for
instance the approach adopted in the case of Finance Watch, an
organization comprising different consumer groups, retail investor
associations, housing associations, trade unions, foundations, think
tanks, and NGOs, whose creation was sponsored by the European
Parliament during the crisis with the objective of establishing a more
effective counterweight to industry lobbying in regulatory debates.
Another solution relies instead on the creation of “proxy advocates”
within regulatory institutions. These are internal agencies tasked to
provide regulators with expertise and information from a consumer
perspective, to challenge regulatory policies, and to represent the public
interest at large in the decision making process.83 This mechanism is
common outside of finance, where different utilities regulators have
established standing panels of consumer representatives to provide
expert consumer input.
Similar mechanisms have also been established within finance by
various US insurance regulators, the European Commission (the
84 Farnish (this volume). See also Ridley (this volume).
85 Ridley (this volume).
86 Porter (this volume). Walter (this volume). Helleiner and Porter (2010). ‘Making
Transnational Networks More Accountable.’ Economics, Management and Financial
Markets, 52.
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Financial Services User Group), and the British FSA (Consumer Panel).
However, the capacity of these bodies to truly represent consumer
perspectives in the regulatory process is constrained by different
factors such a limit to the resources allocated to such bodies, as well
as their location within the organization. For this reason, Farnish 
has called for supplementing internal proxy advocates with
independent external consumer bodies that may benefit from greater
independence, capacity to set their own agenda, and capacity to speak
out publicly if they disagree with the decisions of regulators.84
1.3.1.3 Strengthening competition within the financial industry
While the strategies described above seek to mitigate capture by
increasing the capacity of consumers of financial services and other
non-financial parties to act as counterweights to the producers’
interests, this strategy is less applicable to the case of those markets
where the counterparties are not retail consumers but rather other
financial groups, such as in the case of wholesale markets.85 A variety
of authors have therefore advocated the introduction of measures to
encourage the emergence of countervailing forces against the risk 
of capture from within the industry and to promote a greater
engagement of those financial groups with a material incentive for
stronger regulation.86
Some industry practitioners have argued that it is in the long-term
interest of the financial industry to promote a strong regulatory
infrastructure capable of achieving stability and restoring confidence
in the financial system. However, short-term competitive concerns,
rather than long-term interests in a more stable regulatory
environment, seem to have dominated in a range of circumstances the
engagement of financial groups in the policy arena. For instance, in the
case of banking regulation, the capacity of investors in bank debt to
87 FSA (2009), op. cit. in footnote 17.
88 Strachan (this volume).
89 Porter, this volume.
90 Helleiner and Porter (2010), op. cit. in footnote 85.
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act as a countervailing force to the management of banks is
constrained by the dispersed nature of the investor community, the
short-termism of part of it, and factors constraining market discipline
such as deposit insurance schemes or the moral hazard created by
“too big to fail” institutions.87 Similarly, in the case of the regulation of
hedge funds, the incentives for banks that provide these investment
vehicles with leverage to lobby in favour of safer standards may be
affected by the fact that many of the same banks also sponsor hedge
funds. Moreover, the mobilization of powerful industry groups is
particularly difficult in the case of complex systemic risk regulation,
though the industry as a whole would have a strong incentive to
address this kind of risk.
Authors have therefore suggested that regulatory mechanisms should
be devised to better align the participation of financial industry groups
in the policymaking process with the promotion of stronger
regulation. Strachan has proposed the establishment of a ‘standing
body of practitioners’ reflecting the composition of the financial
services industry as a whole and therefore less susceptible to the
demands of particular interest groups.88 Porter suggests that giving
rewards to ‘whistleblowers’ who reveal regulatory violations could
give rise to a set of firms with a strong interest in preventing regulatory
forbearance and capture. Similarly, requiring banks to issue contingent
capital – bonds that convert into equity in time of crisis – may
strengthen the incentives for bondholders to promote strong
prudential regulation.89 Helleiner and Porter propose to maintain
some separation between the ownership of clearinghouses and
dealers, so that the former will retain ‘an incentive to protest against
regulatory initiatives that would create opportunities to undermine or
bypass clearing arrangements’.90 The internal attitude of financial
firms towards the regulatory process may be altered through changes
to liability rules. For instance, Baxter argues that extending the
fiduciary duties of the board and of top executives to cover others as
91 Baxter (this volume).
92 For a review of this literature, see Barkow (2010), op. cit. in footnote 77. The
importance of statutory independence has been discussed in this volume by Mogg
(this volume), Green (this volume), and Diplock (this volume).
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well as shareholders may also affect the incentives of the industry
towards regulatory policies.91
In sum, the objective of promoting a greater plurality of voices and
perspectives in the regulatory process can be achieved not only by
opening up the rulemaking process to stakeholders outside of the
financial industry that are currently under-represented, but also by
actively promoting a greater engagement of those stakeholders within
the financial industry with a material interest in preventing capture.
1.4 Reforming the institutional context
Measures which seek to mitigate capture by incorporating a wider
range of stakeholders in the regulatory process are unlikely to be
effective in cases in which the institutional context within which the
stakeholder input is processed into regulatory policies is perceived as
favouring certain interests over others. Similarly, these measures are
unlikely to be able to address the problem of capture during the
process of financial supervision, which is based on a continuous
interaction between the supervisor and the firm that is supervised. A
second approach to mitigate the risk of capture has therefore focused
on addressing those institutional biases which create incentives for
regulators to favour financial industry groups under their supervision.
Granting regulatory agencies statutory independence and insulating
the regulatory process from political horse-trading and short-term
pressures of politicians interested in appeasing politically influential
special interests have frequently been presented as the primary
institutional fix to protect the diffuse interest of the general public
against the risk of capture.92 Independence is a particularly valuable
safeguard against capture in those areas that are more susceptible to
economic and electoral considerations, such as prudential supervision
and macroprudential regulation, where regulators are more likely to
be subject to strong pressures not to lean against the wind during
93 Valencia and Ueda (2012). Central Bank Independence and Macro-prudential
Regulation. IMF Working Paper, WP/12/101.
94 Barkow (2010), p.17, op. cit. in footnote 77.
95 ibid. p. 50.
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boom times. Regulatory independence remains an important
safeguard to allow regulatory authorities to resist capture and to
conduct themselves with a “through the cycle” mentality and resist
the forces toward leniency during periods of economic booms.93
However, the statutory autonomy of regulatory agencies is not in itself
a sufficient safeguard against the risk of capture, especially when
some institutional features of the agencies may have the impact of
biasing the conduct of regulators towards certain groups. As Barkow
has argued, ‘under modern conditions of political oversight, other
design elements and mechanisms are often just as important to an
agency’s ability to achieve its long-term mission relatively free from
capture’.94 The institutional design elements discussed in this chapter
regard 1) the mandate of regulatory agencies, 2) their internal decision
making procedures, 3) the staffing and recruitment practices of
regulatory agencies, and 4) the way regulatory agencies are funded.
1.4.1 Mandate
Different authors have acknowledged how the mandate which
regulators receive from parliament in legislation may affect the
possibility that the conduct of the regulatory agency will be captured
by special interests. Barkow argues that giving regulatory agencies a
broad jurisdiction makes it more likely that they will be able to resist
pressure from narrow groups. At the same time, if a regulatory agency
is given ‘conflicting responsibilities that require the agency to further
the goals of industry at the same time that it is responsible for a
general public-interest mission’, it is likely that ‘industry pressure and
a focus on short-term economic concerns that are easily monitored
will trump the long-term effects on the public that are harder to
assess’.95
From this perspective, the approach common to many financial
regulatory bodies of postulating a broad range of duties and placing
96 Walter (this volume); Currie (this volume).
97 Walter (this volume); Strachan (this volume).
98 Currie (this volume); Green (this volume).
99 Strachan (this volume); Sheng (this volume); Baxter (this volume).
100 Strachan (this volume).
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upon the regulator the responsibility of balancing these duties is
described by different authors as particularly problematic.96
Ambiguities in the mandate of regulatory and supervisory agencies, or
the presence of more distinct objectives, may lead regulatory agencies
to unduly prefer one at the expense of others and to create
opportunities for firms seeking to exploit those situations where
supervisors can exercise discretion.97 Clearly identifying a primary
duty of the regulators could support them in asserting their
independence of politicians and special interests.98
1.4.2 Internal decision making procedures
Besides the formal mandate of regulatory agencies, other proposals
have focused on the internal processes through which regulatory
decisions are taken that may make regulators more likely to unduly
favour narrow interests. For instance, various authors have discussed
how periodically rotating regulatory staff, similar to the rotation policy
that exists for auditing purposes, may play a role in preventing
supervisors from developing an excessive affinity to the market
participants they regulate or an excessively narrow understanding of
their responsibilities.99 According to Strachan, the same objective
could also be pursued by subjecting the approach of individual
supervisors to the scrutiny of an internal peer review process, as well
as by ensuring that the most important decisions, such as those
‘around capital, liquidity, the overall supervisory evaluation and
enforcement action’ are taken by a committee rather than by
individual supervisors.100
Reforms in the internal decision making procedures may also be
adopted in order to ensure that the development of regulatory
policies takes into account a broader set of concerns and voices. For
instance, authors have suggested that all policy proposals should be
101 Raeburn (this volume).
102 Farnish (this volume).
103 Currie (this volume).
104 Currie (this volume); Strachan (this volume).
105 IEO (2011). ‘IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis:
IMF Surveillance in 2004–07’, Independent Evaluation Office of the International
Monetary Fund.
106 Kwak (forthcoming), supra footnote 26. See also Carpenter, Moss, Wachtell
Stinnett (this volume).
107 Currie (this volume).
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subject to an impact assessment to identify the implications for 
the real economy,101 or should be assessed against a consumer
checklist.102 Currie has also discussed the empowering of internal
panels to perform an internal audit function, checking whether the
‘regulatory decision making had placed the consumer and citizen
interest at the heart of its processes from the outset’.103
Moreover, internal adjustments in the organizational elements 
and decision-making processes of regulatory agencies are also
instrumental in addressing the issue of intellectual capture. For
instance, exposing key decisions to a wider group of people with
different backgrounds and mind sets may play an important role in
mitigating the risk of intellectual capture which derives from the
proximity that develops between firms and their supervisors.104 The
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF has recommended to
‘actively seek alternative or dissenting views by involving eminent
outside analysts on a regular basis in Board and/or Management
discussions’, and to better reflect areas of significant disagreement
and minority views in internal documents. Another set of proposals
from the IEO has focused on ‘strengthen[ing] the incentives to “speak
truth to power”’, such as by encouraging staff to challenge the views
of the management and of the country authorities supervised by the
Fund, as well as by giving staff ‘the possibility of issuing reports
without the need for Board endorsement’.105 Along these lines,
different authors have suggested that regulatory agencies should
institutionalize within their structure a ‘devil’s advocate’ figure to raise
contrarian viewpoints,106 or create internal advisory boards ‘to
challenge and think the unthinkable’.107
108 Green (this volume); Ridley (this volume). The danger associated with this
proposal is that the periodic review may occur during the wrong point in the cycle,
creating new opportunities for certain actors to seek to water down the regime.
109 See proposal by US Senator Ted Kaufman cited in Lin (2010). SEC’s ‘revolving door’
under scrutiny. MarketWatch. 16 June 2010.
110 Cited by Masters (2012).
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Finally, internal adjustments in the processes through which
regulatory policies are designed and implemented could also be
introduced to mitigate the cyclicality of regulatory capture. In
particular, different authors have discussed how formal mechanisms
could be introduced to review the legislation and regulatory approach
periodically, ‘irrespective of whether a crisis or scandal has taken place
and irrespective of the general health of the economy’, in order to
mitigate the impact of the electoral and economic cycle over the
content of regulation.108
1.4.3 Staffing and recruitment
Another set of proposals has sought to mitigate the incentives for
regulatory agencies to unduly favour the regulated industry by looking
at such agencies’ staffing and recruitment practices, and in particular
to protect them from the “revolving doors” phenomenon.
Two competing approaches have emerged on this issue. Some
commentators have called for steps to constrain, as much as possible,
the appointment into regulatory positions of people with industry
backgrounds that may create frequent impartiality conflicts or to bar
regulators from finding employment within industries that might have
benefited from their work in the past.109 The Governor of the Bank of
England, Mervyn King, has argued that the best way to improve
supervision and regulation should be to ‘create people who believe
that it is a public-service calling to work in the Bank of England 
and spend a good chunk, if not all, of their career as banking
supervisors’.110
On the other hand, other authors have stressed that regulation and
supervision of complex financial activities requires the kind of
technical expertise and understanding of the economics and business
111 Che (1995). ‘Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion.’
RAND Journal of Economics, 26(3): 378-97. GAO (2011b). Maskell (2010). ‘Post-
Employment, “Revolving Door”, Laws for Federal Personnel’, Congressional Research
Service. See also Ridley, Strachan, and Walter (this volume).
112 Strachan (this volume).
113 IIF (2011). Achieving Effective Supervision: An Industry Perspective, Institute of
International Finance.
114 Ridley (this volume).
115 POGO (2011), op. cit. in footnote 47.
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models of the industry and therefore that this is likely to be found
uniquely among those people with a direct experience working in the
financial services industry.111 As a result, seeking to dissuade the
exchange of people across regulatory agencies and the firms they
regulate may be detrimental, insofar as this limits the capacity of
regulatory agencies to recruit people with the relevant expertise.
Contrary to what is argued by Mervyn King, some have argued that
public policies should encourage, rather than restrict, the exchange of
people between the industry and regulatory agencies – through
secondments, structured training programmes for supervisory staff,112
internships for their staff to financial institutions outside of the
jurisdiction being supervised,113 or by developing a multistage career
pattern in both sectors.114
Different approaches have therefore been suggested to allow
regulatory agencies to acquire the expertise needed from the market,
while seeking to mitigate the conflicts of interest which that may give
rise to.
One set of proposals has focused on injecting greater transparency
into the movement of people between regulatory agencies and 
the financial industry, for instance by requiring public disclosure 
in a registry of the history of those ex-regulators who represented
clients before their former agency, or, more broadly, requiring
regulatory agencies to disclose publicly the ties of individual regulators
with the private sector.115 Other proposals have focused on the
establishment of “cooling off periods”, stipulating a minimum 
number of years required before regulators are able to seek
employment with interests that may have significantly benefited from
116 Helleiner and Porter (2010), op. cit. in footnote 85. and POGO (2011), op. cit. in
footnote 47.
117 Currie (this volume).
118 Strachan (this volume)
119 Green (this volume)
120 Currie (this volume), Raeburn (this volume), and Farnish (this volume).
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the policies they formulated, or prohibiting new employees from the
industry to be involved in matters related to their former private-
sector employer.116
An alternative approach has focused instead on calibrating the scope
of employment restrictions according to the level of seniority. Currie
has suggested that tougher standards for pre- and post-employment
restrictions should apply to senior executive teams and to the board of
regulatory institutions, allowing in the latter case ‘no conflicts and no
immediate past involvement with any of the major players’.117 This
approach would rectify the anomalous presence of people with direct
involvement in the banking industry that characterizes the most senior
positions and the board of different financial regulatory bodies, while
still allowing these institutions to recruit the required expertise in the
market.
Another set of mitigating strategies relies on complementing the
presence of regulatory staff with direct experience from the financial
industry with a group of career supervisors who identify their long
term future with its public service aims and objectives and who have
a more questioning attitude towards the latest market trends and
innovations.118 In a similar vein, Green argues that while some of the
skills required to provide effective supervision can be ‘brought in from
the market’, the broader understanding of the wider market
environment as a whole – a prerequisite for effective supervision –
‘only comes with a certain minimum supervisory experience in terms
of both length and breadth of service’.119
Finally, an alternative approach would be to balance the recruitment
of regulators with current knowledge of the industry with people who
possess a diversity of professional experiences and training.120 For
instance, Raeburn has argued that financial regulatory agencies need
121 Raeburn (this volume).
122 Chwieroth (2009). Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization.
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, pp. 249-50.
123 IMF Administration Department, cited by Momani (2005). ‘Recruiting and
Diversifying IMF Technocrats.’ Global Society, 19(2): 167-87.
124 Finnemore, in: IMF (2002). ‘Governing the IMF.’ Transcript of an Economic Forum,
International Monetary Fund.
125 Walter (this volume); Fullenkamp and Sharma (2012), op. cit. in footnote 59.
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to recruit individuals whose backgrounds qualify them to recognize
the impact of regulatory policies beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of the
participants in financial markets.121 This approach is particularly
important in injecting greater intellectual diversity into the activities of
regulatory agencies and to reduce the risk of groupthink. As Chwieroth
argues, recruitment procedures represent a ‘pathway through which
new beliefs can be transmitted’ to the organization, and organizations
that recruit uniquely among individuals with a specific type of training
remain particularly vulnerable to developments within that sector or
profession.122 For instance, the IMF has in the past broadened its
recruitment patterns in order to ‘bring to the Fund a small number of
career staff who might approach policy questions from a new and
somewhat different perspective’,123 seeking in this way to counter the
criticisms presented against the organization for displaying “less
intellectual diversity than the Pentagon”.124
1.4.4 Funding of regulatory agencies
A final set of institutional reforms has identified the source and the
level of funding of regulatory agencies as the key to mitigating the
internal incentive problems that may make regulators prone to be
captured. The difference in salary between the private and public
sectors remains one of the primary determinants of the revolving
doors phenomenon, as inadequate funding limits the capacity of
regulatory agencies to retain experienced staff. Furthermore, limited
resources constrain the capacity of regulatory agencies to conduct
research, generate knowledge, and to be a source of new ideas, thus
increasing the risk that regulators will defer to the financial industry
and rely excessively on its information.125
126 Grocer (2010). Want to Fix SEC’s Revolving Door? Give the Agency More Money.
Wall Street Journal, 16 June 2010.
127 FSA (2011). ‘The failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland.’ Financial Services Authority
Board Report, London, Financial Services Authority, section 3.3. The investigation has
concluded that ‘the approach to resourcing the supervision of the largest banks was
fundamentally flawed and, critically, the resources applied were far too low
adequately to meet the challenges of supervising RBS’, pp.279-80.
128 Baxter (this volume); Ridley (this volume).
129 Strachan (this volume); see also Diplock (this volume)
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Unfortunately, the resources available to regulatory agencies have
often failed to keep up with their expanding responsibilities. For
instance, while from 1939–2009 the number of SEC employees has
little more than doubled, the number of shares trading hands each 
day in the US has increased more than twenty times.126 Also, the
recent investigation in the UK into the failure of the Royal Bank 
of Scotland has raised concerns regarding the inadequacy of the
funding of regulatory agencies, as the task of supervising a bank 
with a presence in over 50 countries and employing 226,400 people
was fulfilled at the beginning of the crisis by a team comprising only
four-and-a-half members.127 This discrepancy in the resources
available has been aggravated by the response to the crisis, as the
significant expansion in the remit and responsibilities of different
regulatory agencies has in some cases been followed by denials 
of adequate funding to perform these additional tasks.128 From 
this perspective, increasing the resources available to regulatory
agencies may be regarded as one way to mitigate the risk of capture.
This would allow regulatory bodies to increase their capacity to recruit
and retain experienced staff and decrease their reliance on the
financial industry.
Nevertheless, different views remain regarding what kind of funding
model would achieve this goal while reducing the possibility of
regulatory capture. The government represents the most natural source
of additional funding, though this may increase the risk of capture by
giving politicians undue influence over the regulatory process, and in
particular by giving the government the power to “starve” the regulator
of resources in order to constrain its operations.129 Indeed, Walter has
argued that systematic under-resourcing of regulatory agencies in the
130 Walter (this volume). The former chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt argued that
during his tenure Congress constantly threatened the SEC with budget cuts if it
pursued more assertive regulatory efforts. See Barkow (2010), op. cit. in footnote 77.
Fullenkamp and Sharma (2012), op. cit. in footnote 59.
131 E.g. see Hardy (2006); ibid. According to proposed legislation presented by the US
Treasury in December 2011, the cost of the newly created Federal Stability Oversight
Council will be raised by collecting semiannual fees from US bank and foreign banks,
as well as nonbank institutions that fall under the supervision of the Federal Reserve.
132 Strachan (this volume).
133 Currie (this volume).
134 Baxter (2011), op. cit. in footnote 14.
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United States in the period before the crisis represented ‘a common
legislative tactic that contributed to the undermining of effective
regulation’.130
However, the alternative of funding the activities of regulators through
a levy upon specific financial institutions, or more broadly on the
financial system,131 has the potential to exacerbate the problem 
of capture by increasing regulators’ sense of obligation towards the
firms that fund their activities.132 An alternative to these two funding
models proposed by Currie is that of a mixed model differentiating
between the source of the funding and control over it, where 
funding comes mainly from the industry but the government oversees
the level of funding.133 However, given the difficulty for any of 
these mechanisms to raise sufficient funding for public sector 
salaries to be able to compete with those in the financial 
industry, Baxter has discussed the importance of developing non-
monetary forms of compensation in the public sector, as well as the
importance of boosting the ‘reputation and prestige’ of regulatory
agencies.134
Moreover, attempts to mitigate the risk of capture by raising the
resources of regulatory agencies may be reinforced by the
introduction of measures to better align the compensation structure
of regulators with the public interest. Various authors have called for
regulating the compensation of regulators in a way which is similar 
to the regulation of bankers’ bonuses. Such proposals include the
suggestion of deferring the majority of regulators’ pay, so that a
regulator would lose a portion of it should shortcomings in his actions
135 Bebchuk and Spamann (2010). ‘Regulating Bankers’ Pay.’ Georgetown Law Journal,
98(2): 247-87. Kane (2010). ‘The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-
Net Consequences of Regulation Induced Innovation.’ Review of Social Economy, 58.
Fullenkamp and Sharma (2012), op. cit. in footnote 59. For a discussion see Barth,
Caprio and Levine (2012), p. 227, op. cit. in footnote 1.
136 Strachan (this volume).
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come to light, or to require a portion of regulators’ deferred
compensation to be invested into a fund which provides capital
insurance to financial companies.135
In sum, there appears to be a range of important prerequisites for
regulators to be able to carry out their duties without unduly favouring
certain special interests: a clear and unbiased mandate, adequate
internal procedures which expose regulatory decisions to a variety of
views, an adequate framework to manage conflicts of interest from
the revolving door issue, and appropriate funding.
1.5 External checks and balances
The policy measures discussed above have sought to mitigate the risks
of capture from the inside by correcting not only stakeholders’ access
to the regulatory process, but also the institutional elements that may
bias regulators towards the regulated financial industry. However,
other policy approaches have focused on subjecting the regulatory
process to a set of external checks and balances and ensuring that
regulatory authorities are constantly supervised, held accountable,
and challenged.
In theory, the conduct of regulatory agencies and the possibility that
these will unduly favour special interests are already subject to
multiple checks. A first set of checks is provided from their board and
other internal review mechanisms. A second line of defence comes
from the scrutiny of parliamentary committees or branches of
government to which regulatory agencies are periodically required to
respond and which ultimately remain the ‘guardians of the balance of
interests’ in a democratic context.136 Third, the media, as well as a
plurality of NGOs, research institutes, consumer groups, and business
groups both outside and within the financial sector all play a key role
137 For the role of the media in preventing capture, see Dyck, Moss and Zingales
(2008). ‘Media versus Special Interests.’ NBER Working Paper Series No. 14360. For
the role of NGOs and other groups see Scholte and Schnabel, eds. (2002). Civil society
and global finance. London, Routledge, and Porter (2005). Globalization and Finance.
Cambridge, MA, Polity.
138 Baxter (this volume).
139 Currie (this volume); Baxter (this volume).
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in making elected policymakers more attentive to the broader impact
of regulatory policies on their constituency.137
In practice, however, the effectiveness of checks to ensure that special
interests have not acquired a disproportionate influence is severely
constrained. The oversight of parliaments may be affected by short-term
electoral incentives. The composition of the boards of regulatory
agencies may skew their actions. The informational asymmetry and
limited transparency which often characterize financial regulatory
policymaking, combined with the often limited resources public 
interest groups have at their disposal, may limit such groups’ capacity to
scrutinize the operation of regulatory institutions. As Baxter argues,
‘these traditional checks seem inadequate to ensure a balance of
interests because so many regulatory decisions, from emergency lending
by the Fed to daily regulatory sanctions or approvals go unnoticed’.138
Different proposals to mitigate the risk that regulatory agencies will be
captured by special interests have therefore focused on strengthening
the external checks surrounding the regulatory system or on creating
new ones. Four sets of proposals are discussed in this chapter: 
1) measures to enhance the transparency of the policymaking process;
2) measures to strengthen scrutiny by the judicial system; 3) the
creation of independent expert bodies; and 4) checks from other
regulators at the national and international level.
1.5.1 Transparency
One of the easiest ways to promote greater accountability and to
favour the monitoring of instances of undue influence of special
interests is to increase the transparency of the financial regulatory
process.139 For instance, different commentators have suggested that
140 See The Regulatory Information Reporting Act introduced by Senator Sheldon
Whitehouse in July 2011; Strachan (this volume); Mogg (this volume).
141 Walter (this volume)
142 Baxter (this volume).
143 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012), p.12.
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regulatory agencies should be required to publish on their websites
details regarding their meetings with industry representatives, to
make publicly available which groups comment on a regulatory
proposal and whether they would be affected by the proposal
together with the content of their response, as well as how the views
of these groups have been taken into account in reaching the final
conclusions.140 Measures to enhance the transparency of the
relationship between regulators and the regulated industry would be
particularly valuable in the implementation phase of regulatory policy,
where the confidentiality of supervisory relationships may make it
more difficult to detect cases of capture.141
Some of the measures which seek to enhance the disclosure of
information between regulators and different firms have been
criticized on the basis that they could force firms to disclose
commercially sensitive information that may be used by their
competitors. From this perspective, too much transparency would have
the negative effect of deterring firms from sharing their information
with regulators. Moreover, during the crisis the Federal Reserve has
during the crisis resisted the demands to disclose information regarding
its emerging lending activities. However, according to Baxter, existing
restrictions on the disclosure of information with regard to the
interaction between regulators and the regulated firms ‘have ended up
protecting the central bank and financial institutions from political and
shareholder accountability more than preserving financial stability’.142
There are however objective limits to what greater transparency can
achieve in detecting instances of capture. Unlike in the area of central
banking, there are objective limits to the possibility of quantifying and
communicating the extent to which the objectives of regulation are met.
Moreover, even if all the relevant information were released to the
public, this does not guarantee that there will be stakeholders with the
resources and incentives to process it and monitor regulators’ actions.143
144 Magill (forthcoming). ‘Courts and Regulatory Capture.’ In: Preventing Regulatory
Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It, by Carpenter and Moss
(forthcoming). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Mogg (this volume); Currie
(this volume).
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1.5.2 The legal system
Another potential source of external checks against the risk of capture
could come from the legal system. As the experience of other sectors
reveals, granting the right for different stakeholders to appeal some
regulatory decisions in the courts, either owing to process failures or
to substance, may provide an external check over those situations
where regulatory decisions are not based on solid evidence and where
special interests play an excessive influence.144 According to Magill,
the greater independence of judges from the political system and their
longer tenure may make them less prone to being captured than
regulators.145 Moreover, the presence of a legal review process may
also have indirect benefits by favouring the accountability of
regulators. As Currie argues, the presence of an external legal review
may make the regulator ‘much more mindful of the need to ensure
that its decisions comply with its statutory duties and are well
reasoned and grounded in fact’.146
However, similar to the measures to increase the level of transparency
discussed above, the application of this approach in the financial
regulatory sphere incurs some severe limitations. The scope of
financial regulatory decisions that can be subjected to judicial checks
as a mechanism to detect instances of capture is limited by the nature
of financial regulatory policies. In particular, the slow nature of judicial
review frequently clashes with the technical complexity of financial
regulatory issues, the difficulty of clearly identifying instances when
regulators have deviated from the public interest, and the fast pace of
the issues regulators have to deal with on a daily basis. While some
authors present judicial review as a factor which levels the playing
field, allowing the weaker stakeholders to challenge episodes of
capture by those in a stronger position, this solution may also have the
opposite effect of empowering those parties with more resources
147 Barkow (2010), op. cit. in footnote 77.
148 Barth, Caprio, and Levin (2012), op. cit. in footnote 1; Levine (2010). ‘The
Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis.’ BIS
Working Paper 329.
149 Omarova (2012). ‘Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation.’ Journal of Corporation Law, 37(3).
150 Baxter (this volume).
151 Davies (2010). ‘Comments on Ross Levine’s paper “The governance of financial
regulation: reform lessons from the recent crisis”.’ BIS Working Paper 329. See also
Levine (2010), op. cit. in footnote 147.
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since these are in a better position to take advantage of this
mechanism.147
1.5.3 Expert review bodies
Given the limitations to the existing checks on the regulatory process,
different authors have proposed the creation of external independent
watchdogs with the responsibility of checking the operations of
regulatory authorities in order to detect deviation from the public
interest.
For instance, Barth, Caprio, and Levine have called for the creation of
an independent institution called the “Sentinel” whose unique power
would be to acquire information required to assess financial
regulation and to provide an expert and independent assessment of
financial policies, thus allowing an informed debate.148 Along the same
lines, Omarova has advocated the creation of a “Public Interest
Council” in charge of advising Congress and regulators with respect to
issues of public concern.149 Baxter has proposed a more limited
solution in the form of a self-funding consulting organization that
could be consulted on key financial regulatory issues, to be established
on the model of the MITRE organization, a not-for-profit organization
created in the US to conduct research on national defense issues.150
Howard Davies has discussed the possibility that a ‘Sentinel-like body’
could be set up by the financial industry itself.151
While these bodies would be staffed by experts and focus uniquely on
financial regulatory issues, other proposals have instead suggested
that this public interest check over financial regulatory policies should
152 Walter (this volume).
153 Walter (this volume).
154 Diplock (this volume).
155 Baxter (this volume).
156 Davies (2010), op. cit. in footnote 155.
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be performed by a body whose remit goes beyond finance. Examples
in this regard are the “Office of Regulatory Integrity”, as proposed by
US Senator Sheldon Whitehouse in the Regulatory Capture Prevention
Act of 2011, or the Australia’s Productivity Commission discussed by
Walter.152 As Walter argues, ‘requiring all legislation/rule setting to
pass through a general public interest review process would help
because the controversial concept of the “public interest” should be
defined transparently and in general terms rather than on a sectoral
basis’.153
Finally, the case for the establishment of Sentinel-like bodies has been
presented not only at the national, but also at the international level.
In particular, Diplock has proposed the creation of a public interest
oversight body composed of international experts with no active
regulatory roles, tasked to make recommendations to the members of
the international regulatory community regarding to what extent
international standards meet the test of public interest.154
However, important concerns have been voiced regarding the
effectiveness and viability of subjecting the work of regulatory
agencies to the scrutiny of expert public interest bodies, in particular
as to how it would be possible to finance these bodies without further
depriving existing regulatory institutions of resources,155 and to what
extent the highly political task of actually defining “public interest” on
a given regulatory issue can be ‘entrusted to a group of disinterested
“wise men”’.156
1.5.4 Checks from other national and international regulators
Given the political difficulties in creating and funding new Sentinel-
type bodies, an alternative source of checks and balances against
capture may be provided by other regulatory agencies. Not only does
the division of regulatory responsibilities across different agencies
make it more difficult for any single group to dominate the regulatory
process, but it also creates the potential for each regulator to
represent a source of reciprocal oversight against undue interference
of special interests in the work of other bodies. This kind of reciprocal
oversight is particularly likely when different agencies have competing
mandates, as well as when they are subject to consultation
requirements or shared oversight over certain markets.157
From this perspective, recent innovations introduced in different
countries in response to the financial crisis have improved the
conditions for such reciprocal checks and balances to emerge. For
instance, the crisis has led in different countries to bodies with
macroprudential mandates, which may provide a system-wide
perspective and challenge the undue influence of special interests in
specific sectors.158 Newly created institutions such as the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau in the US or the Financial Conduct
Authority in the UK have been given an explicit mandate to protect
consumer interests in the regulation of financial products.159 The crisis
has also led to the creation of institutions such as the US Office of
Financial Research, which according to Barth, Caprio, and Levine
‘might in theory act like a Sentinel’.160 The creation of bodies such as
the US Financial Stability Oversight Council, which includes the major
regulatory institutions, has opened up a new platform to foster
communication between regulatory bodies.
Reciprocal oversight on the work of regulatory authorities might also
be provided at the international level. Over the years, different
mechanisms have been created to subject national regulatory
agencies to the scrutiny of international institutions. The East Asian
financial crisis of 1997-8 has led the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank to expand their remit to include periodic reviews of
the financial system of their member countries through the Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the Reports on the
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). However, the
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effectiveness of this review process has, frequently been questioned,
particularly given the capacity in the past of individual countries to
block the publication of these reports and the limited power of
international institutions to challenge their most important
countries.161
Alternatively, national regulatory authorities could themselves provide
international checks as they monitor their peers’ activities in foreign
countries. The international competitive dynamics which characterizes
many financial markets mean that foreign regulatory authorities will
have a strong incentive to denounce their counterparts, should they
engage in regulatory forbearance and weak compliance in the
implementation of internationally agreed standards which may give
their domestic firms a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their foreign
competitors.162
Innovations introduced since the crisis have created opportunities for
national regulatory authorities to monitor the conduct of their
counterparties and to identify national departures from international
rules that lack reasonable public interest justifications.163 G20
countries have agreed to be subject to periodic peer reviews
conducted under the aegis of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), both
on a thematic and on a country basis. The FSB has also been given the
authority to propose exceptional measures for countries lagging
behind in the implementation of internationally agreed standards,
including blacklisting non-cooperative jurisdictions.164 The FSB, in the
conduct of its peer reviews, has established procedures to manage
bilateral complaints regarding other countries’ non-adherence to
internationally agreed standards, potentially tilting the playing field in
favour of their national firms.165 Similar peer reviews will also be
conducted at the European level by the newly established European
supervisory authorities to monitor the implementation of the single
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rulebook among different European countries. Furthermore, the
potential for host-country authorities to monitor instances of
regulatory capture in the policies implemented by their foreign
counterparties has been increased through the creation of “colleges of
supervisors” to supervise internationally active firms, from banks to
insurance firms. Pressures from foreign authorities through peer
reviews and colleges of supervisors may play a valuable role in
preventing the design and implementation of regulatory policies
which may unduly favour home-country financial institutions at the
expense of other jurisdictions.
In sum, it is important to acknowledge how some of the institutional
innovations that have been set in motion during the response to the
crisis have the potential to increase the level of external scrutiny
against the risk of capture.
1.6 Conclusions and summary of the contributions to this volume
This chapter has sought to shed light on the challenges brought about
by the continuous and intense interaction between financial
regulators and market participants, which characterizes the regulatory
policymaking process in finance, and elucidates the numerous
mechanisms that may cause the content of regulatory policies to
diverge from the public interest and unduly favour special interests.
While the multifaceted nature of regulatory capture and the
complexity of financial markets make this risk an inevitable aspect of
the regulatory process, this chapter has illustrated a variety of policy
approaches through which such risk can partly be mitigated, by
enhancing the plurality of voices in the policymaking process,
correcting those institutional elements which may bias regulators’
actions in favour of special interests, and reinforcing external scrutiny
over the regulatory process.
The breadth of the approaches reviewed above and the choice not to
focus on a single set of measures reflects the difference of opinion
among the contributors to this volume and the literature on the
appropriate approach. It is also an acknowledgement that none of
these remedies alone is likely to address the multifaceted nature of
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the problem of capture. Moreover, as the relationship between
regulators and the regulated industry assumes different forms in
different contexts and countries, so too must the policy approach
adapt to these different environments.166
However, a central theme that emerges from the discussion of these
various approaches is the acknowledgment that measures to ameliorate
the integrity of the regulatory process are more accessible than is often
acknowledged. While some of the policy recommendations discussed in
this chapter require rather broad legislative reforms, important
adjustments to mitigate the risk of capture can be found in more easily
attainable changes in the governance of regulatory agencies, or inside
the financial industry. The regulatory agenda that has emerged since the
aftermath of the crisis has neglected such “low hanging fruits” and
largely focused on fixing gaps in the regulation of specific sectors or
industries. The analysis developed here highlights the fact that paying
attention to the process through which financial regulation is designed
and implemented is equally important in order to build a more resilient
financial regulatory system.
The rest of this chapter briefly summarizes the content of the
contributions to follow.
The first section of the publication invites contributions from the
academic community. Lawrence Baxter (Chapter 2) discusses the
‘elusive nature’ of the concept of capture in financial regulation and
identifies different mechanisms to mitigate its extent. Daniel
Carpenter, David Moss and Melanie Wachtell Stinnett (Chapter 3)
discuss the lessons for financial regulatory policymaking from a recent
collaborative project (Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest
Influence, and How to Limit It), arguing that capture is both less
absolute and more preventable than is typically recognized. Stefano
Pagliari and Kevin Young (Chapter 4) empirically analyse the different
business groups and other stakeholders that make up the rulemaking
phase in financial regulation and examine potential mitigating
strategies emerging from the unique ecology of interest groups that
characterize financial regulatory policymaking. The analysis by
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Andrew Walter (Chapter 5) focuses instead on the implementation
phase, highlighting how the more opaque, extended, and complex
nature of this phase may offer new opportunities for the industry to
capture policy.
The second section offers the perspectives of the regulatory
community by including the contributions of former senior regulators.
Clive Briault (Chapter 6) discusses the UK experience since the late
1990s, arguing that the broader political, social, and cultural context
within which regulators operated played a key role in informing the
attitude of regulators towards the financial industry. Jane Diplock
(Chapter 7) discusses the role of capture in the international sphere
and proposes the creation of a public interest oversight body to
strengthen the integrity and credibility of international standard-
setting bodies. David Green (Chapter 8) looks at how financial
regulation is characterized by a cycle of fluctuation between a period
of regulation or supervisory behaviour that in retrospect appears to
have been excessively slack, and regulation which appears to have
been excessively demanding. Andrew Sheng (Chapter 9) examines
different types of regulatory capture in financial regulation and what
incentives drive its existence, discussing in his conclusion different
ways to deal with this problem. David Strachan (Chapter 10) argues
that it is inevitable that legitimate claims from different stakeholders
may open the policymaking process to the risk or to the perception of
capture, and discusses a series of safeguards which may be employed
to bolster the integrity of, and confidence in, the rulemaking and
supervisory process.
The third section of this report includes contributions from
representatives of financial industry associations and other
stakeholders such as consumer groups and non-financial end users.
Gerry Cross (Chapter 11) looks at how the regulation of financial
services is particularly prone to the risk of “cyclical capture” and
discusses what measures the financial industry can take to avoid the
situation where boom periods in the economy may erode the quality
of supervision. Writing from her perspective as a consumer advocate,
Christine Farnish (Chapter 12) discusses different measures to
strengthen consumers’ input in an environment in which financial
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services firms have a built-in advantage in terms of knowledge, data,
and resources. Richard Raeburn (Chapter 13) examines the difficulties
faced by corporate end users of financial services in dealing with the
round of financial regulation since 2008 and looks at the different
measures to ensure that the financial regulatory process takes account
of its impact on the real economy. Adam Ridley (Chapter 14) reflects
upon his involvement in financial regulation of the investment banking
community and other financial sectors, arguing that capture from the
financial industry remains only one of the pathologies that affects the
regulatory policymaking process.
The fourth and final section brings together the contributions of
policymakers and academics that have reflected upon the experience
of other sectors outside of finance. David Currie (Chapter 15) looks at
his experience as a telecommunications regulator, discussing the
lessons from his experience with regard to the importance of the
marching orders that regulators receive from the legislatures, 
the selection processes for key regulatory positions, the revolving
doors, funding, and the need to build internal checks. John Mogg
(Chapter 16) subsequently reflects upon his experience as chairman of
the gas and electricity regulator in Great Britain. He suggests that the
risks of capture come from a broader set of participants than is
commonly acknowledged and emphasizes the importance of
preserving the independence of regulatory authorities. Finally, Tony
Porter (Chapter 17) offers an insight into the problem of capture in the
financial regulatory arena from the experience of regulation of the
automobile industry, another highly globalized industry with a small
number of powerful producers whose regulation has significant
repercussions for society at large.
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